Fri May 18, 2012
Jason Cherish
Sizing up an Iraqi Withdrawal
By Jason Cherish, Washington, D.C. – October 2010
While the controversial episode of the so-called “Global War on Terror” (GWOT) seems all but closed with U.S. plans to withdraw all troops from Iraq by the end of 2011 it remains very unclear whether Iraqi forces will be able to secure the country alone. In fact, Lieutenant General Babaker Zerbari, the most senior Iraqi military leader has serious reservations as to the readiness of his security forces and believes the U.S should delay its withdrawal until 2020 when they will be better prepared. Not surprising, many Iraqis think the only thing worse than the U.S. occupation of Iraq is a U.S. withdrawal.
And while Americans are eager to close the seven year chapter on the Iraqi war, there are those who have raised concerns about a precipitous withdrawal. Dr. David Patel, a professor of political science at Cornell University is one of those people. The relative stability the nation has enjoyed since the famous “surge” is are subject to change he contends, when U.S. forces (and funding) finish drawing down in Iraq.
Patel has a unique perspective on Iraq. Having spent the better part of 2003 and 2004 in Iraq as a “unilateral” – he had no official affiliation with coalition forces and/or governments other than his status as an American citizen and scholar – Patel went to Iraq to conduct research. He was particularly interested as to how some communities gained the clout that could, in a way, substitute for the authority of the state.
Patel lived with an Iraqi family in Basra (southern Iraq) where he spent most of his time studying tribal groups and the role of mosques in disseminating information and organizing people. With a command of Arabic as well as local dialects, Patel traveled independently throughout the country garnering a “bottom up” view of Iraq society – something he said is missing in American policy-makers understanding of the situation on the ground. .
“A lot of people who go there – especially military officers and policymakers get a snapshot view,” says Patel. “They see their experience there and then they come away with an understanding of ‘how Iraqi society works without an understanding of what’s creating those dynamics and sustaining those dynamics.”
While not critical of the strategy General Patraeus used to crush the insurgency in Iraq, Patel said that policy-makers tend to have a “top down” view which precludes them from anticipating many subtle, but important, implications of their policies. Further, he is not sure that Americans understand why the strategy has been successful—so far.
By Patel’s account, the U.S. has achieved a modicum of stability in Iraq by employing the same strategy the British used in the mid-1920’s and that Saddam’s Baath regime used in the 1990’s basically empowering sheikhs. He contends that General Petraeus’ success was tied to the fact that he engaged tribal sheikhs systematically and gave them access to resources and power in exchange for stability in their areas of responsibility which were clearly defined on maps.
“We said ‘You keep this area calm and we will permit you to do things like run checkpoints and funnel reconstruction resources through you.’”
Nonetheless, while the U.S. believed it was co-opting ancient local structures and allegiances to its advantages, the reality was much more artificial. “These sheikhs suddenly become the local Don Corleone. We appointed Dons all around the country, and the reason why they were Dons is because we made them the Dons,” Patel said. “So what all these policymakers and guys who served in Iraq find in their area of responsibility is that the tribesmen there do anything their sheikh asks. Then they leave there with this image that the sheikhs are all powerful. Anything they tell their guys to do, they’re gonna do. But the thing that sustains that image is the resources that are going in through the sheikh and down to the people. If those resources stop, that authority of the sheikhs will disappear.” In other words, sheikhs have authority, but only because there is some state or some occupying force that’s providing resources to distribute down.
Artificial or not, the strategy worked. Al Qaeda was crushed and attacks dried up. But the strategy also elevated sheikhs by giving them control to most, if not all, of the checkpoints in certain areas.
“That means [the sheikh] controls all the racketeering, all the fuel smuggling, oil smuggling, all the reconstruction that’s going on there,” Patel said. “In many ways, he is the state or some sort of local administration in that area. Stability in Iraq after the U.S.
withdraws its troops and funding depends on how much the new Iraqi state is willing and able to incorporate these guys.”
If Patel is right, ongoing stability in Iraq is far from certain. Iraq has gone without a viable government since parliamentary elections were held on March 7th because Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurdish factions have so far failed to form a coalition, only exacerbating anxieties that conditions in Iraq could backslide.
Some have quipped that in a region where most nations know the outcome of their
elections since months before they are held it is actually a sign of progress that Iraqi leaders are still jockeying for position six months after the elections.
Unfortunately, however, this view discounts the implications at a local level. Since modern Iraq has always been geopolitically significant, security depends upon the government’s ability to continue minting and backing Dons – the sheikhs or tribal leaders – or someone else will, namely Iran.
Although, many governments in the Middle East resent American influence in the region, the alternative of having the Iranian regime extend its influence is a real existential threat. However unpopular the U.S. invasion of Iraq may have been, a hasty withdrawal is no more popular in the region. Indeed, the nature of Arab politics means the opposition to U.S. plans to withdraw will be subtle, barely perceived by the American public. Will the nature of American politics mean that policymakers will ignore the implications of this new reality? Time alone will tell.
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